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Abstract
What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? 
We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized 
cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena 
whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic 
premise of ‘diffusion theory’ — meaning that decision-making is interdependent across 
organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European 
Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We 
then hypothesize two pathways — active and passive — of European Union influence, 
and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition 
for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design 
of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article 
finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization’s structured 
interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union’s own 
level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation 
within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence 
exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; 
and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that 
are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings 
indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European 
Corresponding author:
Tobias Lenz, Department of Political Science, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 
37073 Goettingen, Germany. 
Email: Tobias.lenz@sowi.uni-goettingen.de
674261 EJT0010.1177/1354066116674261European Journal of International RelationsLenz and Burilkov
research-article2016
Article
Lenz and Burilkov 655
Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international 
organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are 
insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.
Keywords
Delegation, diffusion, institutional change, institutional design, regional international 
organizations, regionalism
Introduction
In 2000, African heads of state strengthened the main framework for institutionalized 
cooperation on the continent by replacing the Organization of African Unity with the 
African Union. This transition marked a significant evolution towards more powerful 
regional institutions, resembling those of the European Union (EU). The creation of a 
Commission with a codified right to initiate legislation and to bring infringement cases 
to a new African Court of Justice or Pan-African Parliament led many observers to 
comment on the apparent ‘organisational mirroring’ occurring between the two bodies 
(Haastrup, 2013: 789).
This episode poses an important theoretical question: which factors drive processes of 
institution building within regional international organizations (RIOs)? More specifi-
cally, what role does the EU play in them? Most theories of regionalism, and of interna-
tional cooperation more broadly, are ill-equipped to capture such ‘outside-in’ influences 
because they locate the main drivers of institution building within each respective region. 
They view institutions primarily as reflecting the processes and structures of a given 
region, ones that operate from the ‘inside out’. Dominant functional theories of coop-
eration — such as neofunctionalism (Haas, 1961), (liberal) intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik, 1998) and neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984; Koremenos et al., 
2001) — view RIOs primarily as a response to conflicts or problems of collective action 
resulting from economic or security-related interdependence within a particular region. 
As patterns of interdependence shift, organizations change their form.
Similarly, constructivist or transactionalist approaches emphasize the role of commu-
nication and collective identities (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Deutsch, 1957; Katzenstein, 
2005). They posit that organizations develop in response to changing social processes 
and structures. Taken together, these benchmark studies see factors endogenous to the 
region as being the drivers of institution building. As a recent review of two key works 
on the subject perceptively notes: ‘Neither volume tells us much about interregional 
flows … or about emulation and learning, including the demonstration effects of one 
type of regionalism on another’ (Acharya, 2007: 637). With their focus on intraregional 
influences, most such studies treat, in sum, different RIOs as atomistic entities that 
develop largely independently of each other.
We challenge this widespread assumption in the literature on regionalism by develop-
ing a diffusion account of EU influence on other RIOs, then subjecting it to the first sys-
tematic large-N analysis thereof. We build on a growing body of research in Comparative 
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Politics and International Relations which posits that units of analysis — be they policies, 
national institutions or international organizations — need to be conceived of as affecting 
each other (Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Grigorescu, 2010; Simmons et al., 2006). Institutional 
choices in some organizations systematically shape institutional choices in others. 
Diffusion studies thus analyse how ‘decisions in one country [are] influenced … by the 
ideas, norms, and policies displayed or even promoted by other countries and interna-
tional organizations’ (Gilardi, 2012: 453).
Developing this premise, we posit that the most prominent institutional pioneer in 
regionalism, the EU, systematically affects the institutional evolution of RIOs in other 
parts of the world; we furthermore identify the conditions under which it does so. 
Arguments about EU diffusion — although occurring under different labels — are long-
standing. Early scholars of regionalism acknowledged, but failed to analyse systemati-
cally, the possibility of interregional influences (Haas, 1961). Today, claims about the 
influence that the EU ‘model’ has are commonplace in the literature on regionalism. 
Fioramonti and Mattheis (2015: 1) suggest, for example, that ‘there is little doubt that the 
proactive role played by EU institutions to support regionalism has led to a “diffusion” 
of norms and institutional models’. However, none of these such works present clear 
propositions about EU influence, nor do they systematically test for its effects. A grow-
ing body of case-study work demonstrates such diffusion processes between the EU and 
other RIOs (Jetschke, 2009; Lenz, 2012; Rüland, 2014). A recent special issue on the 
topic confidently claims that the impact of EU diffusion is ‘certainly not spurious’ 
(Börzel and Risse, 2012: 194). While this literature has provided empirically convincing 
evidence that EU diffusion does indeed affect other RIOs in some cases, the external 
validity of these claims remains uncertain at present. Moreover, while we have an emerg-
ing sense of the mechanisms that underlie EU influence, our knowledge about the condi-
tions under which it is likely to matter is limited.
This article offers the first systematic attempt to gauge the effects of the EU on other 
RIOs by drawing on a new and original data set that measures variation in the institu-
tional design of 34 such organizations on an annual basis in the period from 1950 to 
2010. Institutional design has not only become a vibrant field of study in International 
Relations (Koremenos et al., 2001); evidence is also accumulating that design matters for 
substantive outcomes in world politics (Koremenos, 2016).1 It is also widely seen as one 
of the most important ‘objects’ of EU influence. Even though EU influence might affect 
other aspects of regional integration — such as a counterpart’s policy portfolio, the 
development of their economic integration process or their democratic interventions 
(Gray, 2014b; Jupille et al., 2013) — formal institutions are nonetheless a key dimension 
of external influence. Indeed, the EU’s active promotion of regionalism specifically 
seeks to strengthen regional institutions. Simultaneously, the bulk of the literature con-
cerned with processes of emulation of the EU also examines formal institutions.
We draw on the diffusion literature to theorize two pathways of EU influence: first, its 
active promotion of regional institution building through financial incentives and struc-
tured interaction (active influence); and, second, its provision of institutional designs that 
serve as a reference point for policymakers in RIOs elsewhere (passive influence). We 
use prominent diffusion mechanisms as heuristic devices to theorize these two pathways, 
but our goal is not to adjudicate between different causal mechanisms. Recent research 
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shows that such attempts have proven difficult in quantitative studies due to the difficulty 
of matching indicators and concepts — and of dealing with the problem that distinct 
mechanisms ‘are often interrelated’ empirically (Graham et al., 2013: 695; Maggetti and 
Gilardi, 2016).
Therefore, our analysis focuses rather on delineating and measuring the conditions 
under which the two identified general pathways of EU influence are likely to matter, and 
on assessing their relative explanatory power. We also hypothesize that an endogenous 
capacity for institutional change in RIOs — contractual incompleteness — conditions EU 
influence. Using fixed-effects panel estimation techniques, our results show that: (1) both 
the intensity of an RIO’s structured interaction with the EU (active influence) and the 
EU’s own level of delegation (passive influence) are correlated with the level of delega-
tion within other RIOs; (2) passive EU influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect 
than does active EU influence; and (3) these effects are strongest among those RIOs that 
are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments.
Ultimately, our findings suggest that the creation and subsequent institutional evolu-
tion of the EU has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in RIOs elsewhere; 
counterfactually, member states would have delegated less power to independent regional 
institutions in the absence of the EU. From this perspective, the analysis indicates that 
most existing theories of regionalism are incomplete because they neglect the interde-
pendence that exists between different RIOs — and specifically the direct and indirect 
interactions occurring between prominent institutional pioneers and other regional 
organizations. More broadly, the analysis (re-)emphasizes two important insights that 
have been lost from view in many of the recent quantitative studies of diffusion, namely, 
that organizational pioneers are important providers of institutional designs for other 
RIOs and that diffusion processes are often hierarchically structured.
The article proceeds in four further parts. In the next one, we present our theory and 
hypotheses. Then, we operationalize the key variables and describe the data to be used in 
the analysis. The third part regards our estimation techniques and results. A final part 
concludes and discusses the argument’s theoretical implications.
Theory and hypotheses
This article examines the argument that the EU systematically conditions processes of 
institution building within other RIOs. We first theorize two pathways of EU influence, 
drawing on the analytical distinction between active and passive forms thereof, before 
turning to the conditions under which they are likely to become salient within a particular 
organization.
Pathways of EU influence
The first pathway captures the EU’s active influence on other RIOs. Here, EU influence 
is the result of activities consciously designed by a range of EU actors — being aimed at 
actively shaping institution-building processes elsewhere. Supporting regional integra-
tion has been a declared goal of the EU ever since the early 1970s.2 Apart from a few 
global powers and selective ‘strategic partners’ with which it has started to engage in the 
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last decade or so, the EU regularly deals with non-member countries on a group-to-group 
basis rather than bilaterally. Over time, it has developed a holistic policy to support insti-
tution building within many RIOs that includes technical and financial assistance, the 
negotiation of cooperation and trade agreements, as well as political dialogue. This sup-
port is a distinctive feature of the EU’s external relations, and it is driven by a self-
interested desire to generate economies of scale in foreign markets (Robles, 2008) — as 
well as constituting an attempt to ‘lay down an identity marker’ (Grugel, 2004: 621).
One way in which the EU’s active support affects institutional evolution within other 
RIOs is through the incentives offered. Through direct engagement, the EU may change 
‘the relative size of payoffs associated with [institutional] alternatives’ (Braun and 
Gilardi, 2006: 310; see also, Simmons et al., 2006). Sociological institutional scholars 
refer to this mechanism as ‘coercive isomorphism’, defined as ‘both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are depend-
ent’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150). The EU applies pressure through both financial 
incentives and institutional engagement. Financial incentives can be both positive — the 
strengthening of regional institutions can result from a desire to attract EU funding — 
and negative —institutional change is the result of a desire to avoid existing resources 
being withdrawn (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Even though the EU does not 
tie the provision of financial support directly to particular types of institutional change 
occurring, financial dependence on the EU can powerfully affect institution-building 
processes. Moreover, the institutional engagement of the EU with other RIOs may induce 
institutional feedback effects — a key insight of the literature on institutional overlap and 
regime complexity, as well as of that on organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Gómez-Mera, 2016). Structured interaction with the EU requires counterparts to create 
mechanisms for such coordination, which may, in turn, have knock-on effects for institu-
tion building in the RIO in question itself.
The case-study literature provides evidence for the existence of this mechanism. EU 
threats to withdraw funding have previously provided a powerful impetus for institu-
tional reform in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an organiza-
tion that is highly dependent on external donor funding. When the EU and other donors 
(mainly EU member states) considered shifting their financial support to other RIOs in 
the mid-1990s, this ‘threat’ catalysed an organizational restructuring that entailed, inter 
alia, a strengthening of the Secretariat and the establishment of a European Court of 
Justice-type SADC Tribunal (Gray, 2014b; Lenz, 2012: 163–64, 166).
Another way in which active EU influence affects regional institution building else-
where is through ‘socialization’, which can be defined as a ‘process of interaction that 
involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion’ 
(Checkel, 2001: 562). Relying on instrumental and constructivist assumptions, direct 
interaction between actors creates channels for communication that provide opportuni-
ties for teaching and persuasion (for an overview, see Checkel, 2005). Through interac-
tion with the EU, RIO policymakers receive relevant information not only about what 
(and how) institutions work in the EU, but also about salient institutional developments 
in the process of European integration. Most immediately, such interaction might help 
problematize the institutional status quo in an RIO — as well as frame the way in which 
the problem is understood, and what potential solutions to it might look like (Duina and 
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Lenz, 2016; Finnemore, 1993). Over time, such interaction may further lead to the gen-
eration of common knowledge about ‘good’ institutional solutions to particular problems 
(Grobe, 2010). Research into bounded rationality and decision-making has shown that 
policymakers often learn from information that is readily available (Meseguer, 2006), a 
condition that opportunities for direct communication positively affect. Similarly, social-
ization research shows that the intensity and duration of contact crucially shapes the 
extent of adoption of new ideas about cause and effect (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; 
Checkel, 2005).
The literature has documented a wide degree of EU diffusion in the realm of regional 
courts (see Alter, 2012). The creation of the Andean Court of Justice in 1979, modelled 
on the European Court of Justice, is a pertinent example of active EU influence that 
occurred ‘not as a result of direct pressure from or financial linkages to the EU’ (Gray, 
2014b: 19). Instead, networks of Andean and EU experts in the legal realms, which 
served as settings for learning and persuasion, played a key role in the aforementioned 
institution’s establishment. Saldías (2013) offers a detailed account of how personal con-
nections between EU legal experts and influential consultants, as well as officials, in the 
Andean region led to a change in their beliefs about cause–effect relationships regarding 
effective legal systems within economic integration schemes.
Even though theoretically distinct, the incentive- and socialization-based mechanisms 
of EU influence often operate together in real-world situations. Thus, we treat them as 
complementary and mutually reinforcing ways by which active EU engagement with 
other RIOs affects the latter’s institutional evolution, suggesting the following testable 
proposition:
Hypothesis 1 (Active EU influence): The more extensive active EU engagement with other 
RIOs is, the more likely they are, ceteris paribus, to develop stronger regional institutions.
The second pathway captures the EU’s passive influence on other RIOs. The EU is the 
most successful pioneer of institutionalized economic cooperation between neighbour-
ing countries in the post-Second World War era. This pathway, then, captures the idea 
that EU influence stems from the success and attractiveness of its institutional designs.
One way in which the EU’s own institutional evolution shapes regional institution 
building elsewhere is through learning. Learning as a mechanism of diffusion is con-
cerned with information about the effects generated by the institutional choices of others, 
and often by those that pioneer them (Gilardi, 2012; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Simmons 
et al., 2006). As institutional innovations start to take effect, they allow other policymak-
ers to gauge whether they are successful in generating the desired outcomes. Familiarity 
and success are thus key conditions for learning. As Ovodenko and Keohane (2012: 523) 
note, ‘institutional designs that are familiar and perceived by a wide variety of partici-
pants in negotiations as successful in relevant contexts should have greater chances of 
being adopted’. Moreover, diffusion is facilitated by theorization, whereby cause–effect 
relationships derived from a specific experience become theorized as being generally 
applicable. By abstracting from the specificity of the context in which desirable effects 
are initially generated, theorization suggests that ‘similar practices can be adopted by all 
members of a theoretically defined population, with similar effect’ (Strang and Meyer, 
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1993: 496). Institutional pioneers, then, may shape decision-making abroad by providing 
new information that others can learn from.
From this perspective, the EU’s own institutional evolution can be expected to have 
affected regional institution building elsewhere. Many policymakers in other regions are 
familiar with EU institutions. Recent research on outside perceptions of the EU indicates 
that political elites in countries involved in regional integration processes view the EU 
not only as successful, but also as highly relevant to their own efforts (Chaban et al., 
2009). As EU institutions evolve, the information derived from the EU experience is also 
likely to evolve. Similarly, the EU is the most theorized RIO, and such theorization is 
also likely to evolve over time — tracking the EU’s own institutional development. For 
instance, the widely recognized insight that allowing individuals to access regional 
courts is key to the effectiveness of a regional legal system could only develop after 
individuals had started to regularly use the EU one; this took decades to emerge, and was 
a connection forcefully established by Alter’s work (for an overview, see Alter, 2014). In 
this vein, Jetschke and Murray (2012) detail in a case study of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) how learning from the EU shaped the former’s insti-
tutional reform process in the 2000s.
Emulation is another way in which institutional pioneers might passively affect insti-
tutional evolution elsewhere. This phenomenon is concerned with the social construction 
of appropriate behaviour, and can be defined as a process whereby ‘actors model their 
behaviour on the examples provided by others’ (Lee and Strang, 2006: 889). As organi-
zational fields become structured through associational processes, they develop stand-
ards for the legitimate institutional forms that organizations gradually adopt in an attempt 
to enhance their legitimacy — and ultimately their chances of long-term survival 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutional pioneers are particularly likely to be emu-
lated given the premium that exists in organizational fields for appearing similar in struc-
tural form to the most admired and successful organizations (Haveman, 1993). Drastic 
change in one such organization can therefore induce similar change in other organiza-
tions. As Weyland (2008: 290) notes for the sources of domestic policy change, ‘drastic 
change in one country often prompts emulation efforts in other nations by calling atten-
tion to problems and offering ideas for solutions’.
From this perspective, the EU’s own institutional evolution can be expected to have 
affected regional institution building elsewhere. The EU is widely seen as ‘the most 
advanced model of regional integration [in the world]’ (Jetschke and Murray, 2012: 
185). Hence, it is plausible to posit that the EU is the main exemplar among those RIOs 
whose behaviour is likely to be emulated by others. EU institutions might not only pro-
vide boilerplate solutions to given problems; institutional change in the EU may also 
alert regional policymakers to the urgency of addressing certain problems inherent in 
regional integration in the first place (Duina and Lenz, 2016). It should be noted that 
positing emulation as a mechanism of EU influence does not necessarily imply that the 
wholesale adoption of EU designs by other RIOs is a given. It is also conceivable that 
individual member states emulate such models and put them forth as a bargaining posi-
tion in the course of institutional negotiations. To the extent that bargaining outcomes 
reflect more than lowest-common-denominator decisions — an assumption that appears 
reasonable under conditions of iterative bargaining and geographic ‘lock-in’ — then 
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such emulation would nudge the overall outcome towards the emergence of stronger 
regional institutions.
Processes of institutional emulation of the EU are well documented in the case-study 
literature. In a recent article on ASEAN, Rüland (2014: 246) suggests that it ‘mimicked 
European structures of interest representation’ in the 1970s in an attempt to regain legiti-
macy and enhance the organization’s survival prospects. Similarly, Jetschke (2009) por-
trays ASEAN as an ‘isomorphic institution’ that has continuously emulated EU institutions 
as a way to enhance its legitimacy. She demonstrates a striking temporal coincidence 
between institutional change in the EU and similar institutional changes in ASEAN, 
which is suggestive of a form of passive EU influence — occurring due to ASEAN’s 
desire to appear legitimate in the eyes of important both internal and external audiences.
These arguments lead to a second hypothesis concerning the EU’s passive influence 
on other RIOs:
Hypothesis 2 (Passive EU influence): As the EU enhances its institutional authority over time, 
other RIOs are, ceteris paribus, more likely to build stronger regional institutions.
Scope condition of EU influence
Under what conditions are the identified two pathways likely to become salient in affect-
ing processes of institution building beyond the EU’s borders? Diffusion studies conven-
tionally treat internal determinants of institutional and policy change as mere controls, or 
null hypotheses, to demonstrate that diffusion does indeed matter (Simmons et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, most diffusion scholars recognize that these two sets of factors often inter-
act in generating outcomes. Lee and Strang (2006: 888) state, for example, that ‘interna-
tional influences are integrally connected to national politics’, while Checkel (2001: 
553) argues that ‘domestic politics — in particular, institutional and historical contexts 
— delimit the causal role of [norm diffusion through] persuasion/social learning’.
Recent research has sought to model this interaction (Grigorescu, 2010). The theoreti-
cal reason for such internal–external interplay is well established, and has been suc-
cinctly stated by early scholars of the ‘second image reversed’ perspective. As Gourevitch 
(1978: 911) notes, even compelling external pressures ‘are unlikely to be fully determin-
ing, save for the case of outright occupation. Some leeway of response to pressure is 
always possible, at least conceptually’. The analytical challenge, then, is to identify those 
organizational structures that determine the influence of external pressure.
We posit that contractual incompleteness is a key organizational characteristic condi-
tioning the degree of EU influence. It is increasingly recognized that international organ-
izations vary in their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, including pressures of 
diffusion. Not all international organizations are, as International Relations scholars 
widely assume, ‘notoriously resistant to reform or redirection’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004: 2). Instead, some of them regularly engage in institutional change. We argue that 
such variance is a function of the degree of completeness of the contracts upon which 
they are based. The existence of any international organization rests upon a contract in 
which states voluntarily agree to bind themselves to a set of formal rules to facilitate 
cooperation. While all such contracts are incomplete to some degree, they nevertheless 
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vary in the extent to which they contain open-ended commitments. At one extreme, 
founding contracts are fixed — with cooperation being specifically geared towards 
achieving some pre-defined and concrete result, such as establishing a free trade area. At 
the other extreme, contracts are open-ended in that the ultimate intended result of coop-
eration is only vague and ill-defined. In this case, cooperation is intended to evolve over 
time in ways that cannot be conceived of from the outset; the process of cooperation has 
intrinsic value because the result is largely indeterminate.
Consider two contrasting examples: the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) approximates a fixed contract. The final goal of the cooperation ‘process’ is to 
create a free trade area with a pre-defined scope that entails mainly free trade in goods, 
services and investment. Once this is achieved, the organization will have fulfilled its 
purpose; NAFTA is not intended to be an organization that develops further thereafter. 
The Andean Community (CAN), in contrast, rests on an open-ended contract behind 
which the ultimate ambition is to create a ‘homogeneous society’ in the Andes. This is an 
ill-defined purpose that is impossible, and unfeasible, to define in terms of the steps 
needing to be taken to that end from the very outset. Thus, in this case, the process is 
expected to evolve over time.
Our understanding of contractual incompleteness as open-ended commitments 
thereby differs from the more conventional understanding, which captures the extent to 
which contracts ‘specify the full array of responsibilities and obligations of the contract-
ing parties, as well as anticipate every future contingency that may arise throughout the 
course of the exchange relationship’ (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009: 8). This conventional 
understanding refers to the specificity of commitments in ‘existing’ policy areas. 
Crucially, these two contractual characteristics do not necessarily co-vary. Even organi-
zations based on open-ended commitments initiate cooperation in specific policy areas, 
for which the commitments required might be relatively detailed. The founding contract 
of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, for example, contains open-ended com-
mitments regarding the ultimate purpose of the organization, but it also contains specific 
policy ones regarding the creation of a common market — these commitments are rather 
detailed, together encompassing almost 30 pages of text. Importantly, the creation of a 
common market is only seen as an initial step in a longer journey towards ‘closer union 
among the peoples of the East Caribbean’.
These differences in contractual completeness matter, as a voluminous body of litera-
ture in institutional economics has theorized. Incomplete contracts have the virtue of being 
flexible in the face of exogenous shocks and of being apposite when there is uncertainty 
about the nature of the good or service to be provided. They endow participants with an 
enhanced capacity for adaptation because they entail open-ended commitments that can be 
adjusted to unforeseen circumstances (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012; Hart and Moore, 
2008). Such open-ended cooperation projects resemble nation-building processes in their 
absence of an overarching master plan. The inherent flexibility of incomplete contracts 
means that institutions, which structure cooperation on substantive commitments, tend to 
evolve as commitments change, and thus become specified over time.
Institutions, in this case, not only serve to lower transaction costs by structuring and 
enforcing cooperation (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Keohane, 1984); they also play an 
important role in ‘discovering’ an evolving process of cooperation (Marks et al., 2014). 
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Fixed contracts, on the other hand, are bound to be inherently static. Their purpose is 
precisely to engage in a well-specified range of activities that are detailed ex ante. 
Institutions can, in this context, be designed at the outset, and they are less susceptible to 
external pressure. This leads to a third, conditional hypothesis about EU influence:
Hypothesis 3 (Conditional EU influence): The higher the contractual incompleteness of an 
RIO, the more likely it is that EU influence — both active and passive — will lead to stronger 
regional institutions emerging.
Operationalization of variables and data
To test our hypotheses, we analyse the process of institution building in 34 RIOs from 
1950 or the year of their establishment to 2010. We define an RIO in conventional terms 
as a formal international organization composed of three or more geographically proxi-
mate states having a continuous institutional framework. RIOs, then, are conceptually 
distinct from agreements such as the EU–Mercosur Interregional Framework Cooperation 
Agreement, alliances such as the Cairns Group and informal arrangements such as 
ASEAN+3 in their formality. RIOs are based on a written contract formally entered into 
by their member states, that is, they are designed for a continuous purpose and therefore 
have a capacity for ongoing collective decision-making. This involves, at the very least, 
a permanent and independent bureaucracy and a standing decision-making body.
In compiling the sample, we consulted the Correlates of War data set and selected 
organizations that have a distinct physical location or website, a formal structure (i.e. a 
legislative body, executive and administration), at least 50 permanent staff (based on 
information in the Yearbook of International Organizations), a written constitution or 
convention, and a decision-making body that meets at least once a year. We identified 34 
RIOs (including the EU itself) that fit all or all but one of these criteria, including two 
RIOs that no longer exist — the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the first 
East African Community (EAC). The sample (listed in online Appendix A) is broadly 
comprehensive of states and continents, and includes all RIOs that have exercised 
significant authority in the years since 1950.
We see two reasons for limiting the sample to RIOs that have standing in international 
politics. The first is practical. The data requirements for a test of the proposed hypotheses 
would involve evaluating RIOs on the basis of significantly more information than was 
available in any prior data set; thus, given time and financial constraints, it makes sense 
to focus on those RIOs that have left some footprints in the primary sources. In most 
cases, they also feature in the secondary literature, hence our decision to exclude RIOs 
that have no website, address or that are poorly staffed. Second, while we think our argu-
ment might apply broadly, we suspect that states — including EU actors — would over-
all be more likely to pay attention to those RIOs that have a baseline level of financial 
resources available to them.
Dependent variable
At the heart of this study is the strength of regional institutions, and their evolution over 
time. Our very definition of RIOs eliminates substantial variation in basic institutional 
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features. All or almost all of the organizations in our sample have the following: an 
independent secretariat possessing administrative functions; a standing body, generally 
composed of national ministers, that regularly convenes in order to adopt secondary 
legislation; and some form of executive organ that supervises implementation. The vast 
majority of RIOs also feature some form of dispute settlement body, and one comprised 
of non-state actors such as parliamentarians, business representatives and/or non- 
governmental organizations. Whereas these features distinguish RIOs from other inter-
national institutional frameworks such as agreements, alliances or informal arrange-
ments, they are insufficient to capture meaningful variation in institutional strength 
within this group. Therefore, we need to move beyond such basic measures of institu-
tionalization to gauge variation in regional institution building — and the EU’s specific 
influence on it.
One way to do this is to construct a more fine-grained measure of institutional design 
that not only codes the existence/non-existence of important institutional actors, but also 
seeks to estimate their competences in decision-making. Our measure focuses on those 
institutional actors who enjoy some degree of independence from member state control, 
and who thereby characterize ‘supranational’ elements in RIOs. Such independence is 
often conceptualized as delegation, which can be defined as ‘a conditional grant of 
authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the 
former’ (Hawkins et al., 2006: 7; for an overview of relevant concepts, see Hooghe and 
Marks, 2015). The principals — meaning the member states — retain ultimate control, 
but delegated agents enjoy a degree of autonomy that can, and often does, change over 
time. Delegation is considered to be of major theoretical significance, and is widely used 
in other empirical studies of RIOs, preferential trade agreements and global organiza-
tions. It is also a hard case for assessing EU influence because delegation entails sover-
eignty costs. By empowering independent agents, member states lose full control of the 
process of regional cooperation; they also enhance the danger of unanticipated conse-
quences occurring due to agency slack.
The dependent variable Delegation is an additive index of formal delegation in deci-
sion-making processes for each year of a given RIO’s existence (Hooghe et al., forth-
coming). It measures the extent to which member states empower third parties to 
adjudicate disputes, provide expert information, select or prioritize proposals, and, at the 
authoritative extreme, propose policy initiatives, make binding decisions and/or penalize 
contract violations. The extent of delegation is a function of: (1) the composition of the 
organized bodies within a given regional organization (general secretariat, assemblies, 
executives, judicial bodies, consultative bodies) with respect to their independence from 
member state control; and (2) the authoritative competencies of regional bodies in agenda 
setting, final decision-making and adjudication in (3) one or more of six possible deci-
sion areas — accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, finan-
cial non-compliance and policymaking (for further detail, see online Appendix B). The 
measure assesses the formal rules that can be observed in treaties, constitutions, conven-
tions, special statutes, protocols and rules of procedure, which has a distinct advantage in 
that they can be specified independent of actual behaviour.
Figure 1 gives a sense of the sample variation in Delegation, and shows its overall 
evolution (black line) over the period 1950–2010. We see that delegation within RIOs 
has gradually increased over time, with a particularly marked rise coming after the end 
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of the Cold War. Concerning variation across RIOs, median values range from zero for the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Southern Africa Customs 
Union to 0.43 for the second East African Community (EAC), with the remaining regional 
organizations being distributed fairly evenly in between. Three organizations (Council of 
Europe, EAC, Nordic Council) have a parliamentary body that operates as a non-state 
assembly. Four organizations (Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), 
Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and SADC) have a general secretariat with an exclusive right of initia-
tive. Two organizations (CEMAC, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) 
feature a supranational court that provides access to non-state actors and passes prelimi-
nary rulings, and whose rules have direct effect. In the lowest third of the data set are 
regional organizations as diverse as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and the Latin American Integration Association. These organi-
zations have little more than a weak general secretariat that, at most, draws up the budget 
or has a non-exclusive right to initiate policymaking. Although none of the organizations 
in the sample have achieved the level of delegation reached by the EU, some have gradu-
ally evolved in this direction — while others remain at low levels thereof.
Independent variables
Our two key independent variables are active and passive EU influence, respectively. We 
operationalize active EU influence through an aggregate index that measures the EU’s 
institutionalized engagement with other RIOs. In the absence of prior measures, we con-
struct an index of EU engagement that consists of three components designed to capture 
the various ways in which active EU influence affects regional institution building else-
where, which we describe briefly in the following (for further detail on these three 
Figure 1. Delegation in selected RIOs, 1950–2010.
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components, see online Appendix C). The index is quantitative, and the components are 
normalized and weighted equally in the aggregate index. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.863, 
which indicates high scalability. We use the index in our main statistical analysis because 
it allows us to capture the distinct logics separately while also enhancing the robustness 
of our measures. However, we employ its individual components as robustness checks. 
The expectation is that more intensive engagement with the EU will lead to more delega-
tion occurring in RIOs elsewhere.
The first of the three components is the EU’s financial support to other RIOs, which 
is the main way in which the EU shapes incentives for institutional change. EU funding 
is an ordinal variable (with four categories) that captures the amount of funding directed 
to a specific RIO in a given year, encompassing both institutional and project support (x 
< €1 million; €1 million < x < €4 million; €4 million < x < €8 million; x > €8 million). 
Funding streams were coded on the basis of a variety of official documents, primarily 
issued by the EU itself, and we augmented these data with information from the RIOs 
themselves. About half of the organizations have not received any funding from the EU 
during their lifespan.
The second component is EU interregional cooperation agreements, a more indirect 
way by which active EU influence shapes incentives for institutional change. Insti-
tutionalized cooperation measures the policy scope and obligation of all of the EU’s 
agreements with other RIOs in our data set based upon the assumption that interregional 
agreements with a wider policy scope and a higher degree of obligation are more likely 
to exert stronger effects of institutional feedback. We assess an interregional agreement’s 
policy scope based on a list of 29 policy areas, one adapted from Lenz et al. (2015). The 
binding nature of cooperation is assessed on a three-point scale that measures the nature 
of obligations associated with cooperation (non-binding versus binding), as well as the 
existence of interregional monitoring institutions — which forms the highest category of 
obligation. Our institutionalized cooperation score is the sum of the two standardized 
components of policy scope and obligation. We assess a total of 15 agreements that, 
between them, involve nine different RIOs.
The third component is the frequency of institutionalized contact between the EU 
and an RIO, which is widely used as a proxy for opportunities for teaching and persua-
sion in quantitative studies (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007: 712–713). EU contact is a 
count of instances of institutionalized contact between EU representatives and their 
counterparts in a given year across three levels: (1) ministers and heads of state; (2) 
parliamentarians; and (3) technical experts, including representatives of the European 
Commission. The count assumes a value of 3 when all three sets of actors met in a given 
year, and 0 when none of them met — or when no institutionalization of contact took 
place. Contacts were coded on the basis of a variety of documents, such as meeting 
programmes, draft agendas or final communiqués of interregional meetings, augmented 
by website entries and written information elicited by email. The EU has had institu-
tionalized contact with 22 out of the 34 organizations in our data set, but their frequency 
and intensity have varied strongly.
Our second key independent variable is passive EU influence. We expect the EU’s 
own institutional trajectory to affect the degree of delegation in other RIOs. We opera-
tionalize passive EU influence as the evolution of the level of delegation in the EU, 
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coded in the same aforementioned way as we did for other RIOs. With the exception of 
the transition from the European Coal and Steel Community towards the European 
Economic Community in the years following 1957, EU delegation has increased over 
time. This is most markedly true between the Single European Act of 1986 and the 1999 
Treaty of Amsterdam, after which delegation tapers off. As a robustness check, we use an 
alternative measure of passive EU influence calculated by Frank Schimmelfennig on the 
basis of Börzel’s (2005) conceptualization and measurement of the scope of European 
integration. This captures the involvement of supranational bodies and Council voting 
rules in EU decision-making in a given policy area (for details, see Börzel, 2005: 220–
221). The two measures are highly correlated (0.88).
Finally, we operationalize the hypothesized scope condition of EU influence, namely, 
that it depends on an endogenous capacity for RIO institutional change. In the absence of 
prior measures, we take contractual incompleteness as a trichotomous variable that taps 
the extent to which the commitments that member states engage in are open-ended. 
There are two key dimensions of incompleteness, which we combine into a single indica-
tor (see Table 1). The first one is the open-endedness of the policy scope, which we 
assess on the basis of the stipulated objectives of cooperation. This dimension distin-
guishes organizations with a concrete and narrow organizational objective (fixed) — for 
example, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose principal aim 
lies in ‘the co-ordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries’ 
(Art. 2, 1968 OAPEC Agreement) — from those that pursue only a vague and broad-
based objective vis-a-vis cooperation (open-ended) — such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, whose aim is ‘to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the mainte-
nance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region’ and to ‘facilitate 
comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the 
region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership’ (Art. 1, 2002 SCO Charter).
The second key dimension is that of the open-endedness of actor scope, which we 
assess on the basis of whether the treaties emphasize national sovereignty and make 
reference to governments, member states or countries as the only relevant actors. It dis-
tinguishes state-centred organizations (fixed) from those that provide for the potential 
participation of a wider group of actors in the cooperation process (open-ended). State-
centred organizations achieve cooperation objectives through intergovernmental coop-
eration, wherein national governments are the only legitimate actors. This is reflected in 
treaties regularly emphasizing national sovereignty and making continuous reference to 
governments, member states or countries as the only relevant actors. Organizations with 
a more open-ended actor scope, in contrast, do not have these characteristics. Actors 
encompass loosely defined representatives of ‘the people’, as well as national govern-
ments. Such organizations typically include transformational commitments vis-a-vis 
Table 1. Measuring contractual incompleteness.
Policy scope Actor scope
High Open-ended Open-ended
Medium Open-ended Fixed
Low Fixed Fixed
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their societies, which are expressed in references made to a ‘union of peoples’, ‘com-
munity of peoples’ or ‘ever closer union’.
At the point in time of their founding, the 34 regional organizations in our sample divide 
in roughly equal parts across the three categories identified in Table 1. While an organiza-
tion can change its degree of contractual incompleteness over time, this is quite rare. We 
code six single interval moves towards greater incompleteness. Our analysis, presented in 
the following, uses the original contracts for the purpose of this investigation.
Control variables
Our argument about EU influence challenges two other sets of arguments about the driv-
ers of regional institution building, ones that we control for in the analysis. First, our 
argument implies that EU influence is not reducible to other types of external influence 
operating beyond the confines of individual RIOs, including processes of institutional 
diffusion not related to the EU.
Regional delegation. The diffusion literature suggests that patterns of diffusion cluster 
among neighbouring countries or adjacent regional organizations, that is, there is a strong 
geographic element to diffusion processes (Weyland, 2008). This ‘neighbourhood effect’ 
may result from contact and exchange, the sharing of important cultural characteristics, 
and/or membership overlap. In order to capture such effects, we measure Regional del-
egation as the average level of delegation of all neighbouring RIOs in the same geo-
graphic region (either the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East or Asia), with the 
exception of the RIO in question itself.
Global delegation. We also control for genuinely global rather than regional diffusion 
processes. Sociological institutionalists, in particular, expect RIOs, as a distinct category 
of organization, to become more similar in their institutional structure over time due to 
the emergence of a norm of ‘acceptable’ levels of delegation (Powers and Goertz, 2011). 
We tap into such processes by measuring in a given year the average level of delegation 
in the sample, with, again, the exception of the specific RIO in question.
Globalization. The ‘New Regionalism’ literature, in particular, emphasizes globalization 
as being a major driver of regionalism in its various forms (for an overview, see Söder-
baum and Shaw, 2003). As economic, social and political exchanges that cross national 
borders grow, a variety of actors are likely to engage in cooperative endeavours in order 
to manage such interdependencies. The delegation of competences to RIOs by state gov-
ernments might also follow this logic. We divulge the impact of Globalization through 
the widely used KOF Index of Globalization, which captures the economic, social and 
political connections that countries have with the rest of the world (1970–2010) (Dreher, 
2006). We include an aggregated measure based on the RIO mean of each member state’s 
globalization score for a given year.
Cold War. Various other developments that we might expect to affect RIO delegation 
cluster at the end of the Cold War, and we introduce a time dummy (0 = post-1990) to 
nullify their potential confounding effects. The end of intense ideologically driven 
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bipolar competition created new demands for regional cooperation, ones that might be 
reflected in deeper institutionalization. The end of the Cold War also roughly coincides 
with a stalemate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. As the prospects for continued multilateral 
trade liberalization appeared bleak by the late 1980s, states turned towards regional 
options instead — a development that may have led to (the creation of) institutionally 
more ambitious RIOs.
Beyond alternative external influences, our argument about EU diffusion challenges, 
above all, explanations that locate the drivers of institution building in intraregional 
dynamics. The structural characteristics of units are typically the null hypothesis of dif-
fusion studies. We consider several controls internal to each RIO, including the most 
important explanations for international institutional change in general.
Intraregional trade. Perhaps the most firmly grounded expectation in the literature on 
international institution building is that it should co-vary with economic interdependence 
(Haftel, 2013; Keohane, 1984). Economic exchange develops its welfare-improving 
potential to the fullest with stable, predictable property rights. Hence, trade that traverses 
international borders creates a demand for coordination among states so as to provide 
uniform rules. Reducing barriers to cross-border trade is a core rationale of many RIOs, 
and one might expect, therefore, that the growth of trade interdependence within a 
regional organization leads to greater delegation. We measure trade interdependence, 
Intra-RIO trade, as a region’s total trade (imports plus exports) as a proportion of mem-
ber countries’ total trade.
Power asymmetry. Scholars in the tradition of Waltzian neorealism hypothesize that power-
ful states reject strong institutionalization because it inhibits unilateral action, and instead 
prefer intergovernmental arrangements (Abbott and Snidal, 2000: 448). Conversely, 
hegemonic stability theory suggests that an unequal distribution of power may expedite the 
provision of public goods and a hegemon may find the rule of law useful in eliciting the 
compliance of weaker members (Krasner, 1976). We control for these possibilities with a 
measure of power dispersion, Power asymmetry, being the ratio of the material capabilities 
of the most powerful member state to the average of all other members. The Composite 
Index of National Material Capabilities (CINC) Version 4.0 provides a summary measure 
of military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, 
urban population, and total population for individual countries (Singer, 1988).
Members. The extent of delegation within an organization might be sensitive to the size 
of its overall membership base. As the number of members grows, decentralized coop-
eration in the absence of delegated institutions may become more costly as a result of 
issue cycling and increasing informational asymmetry (Hawkins et al., 2006; Koremenos 
et al., 2001: 789). We measure Members as the natural log of the absolute number of 
member states in a given year, assuming that the effect of one additional member joining 
declines as the absolute number increases.
Democracy. Norms of appropriate behaviour in democratic states, or alternatively the 
political context in newly democratizing countries, may render elites more willing to 
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delegate to international organizations (Grigorescu, 2015). An implication of the find-
ings of the democratic peace literature is that autocracies are more likely than democra-
cies to be fearful of exploitation. Newly democratizing states, in particular, may use 
international institutions as external commitment devices (Moravcsik, 2000). We meas-
ure Democracy as the annual Combined Polity Score in the Polity IV data set.
Per capita gross domestic product. Finally, we control for the mean per capita gross domes-
tic product (GDP) of member states in an RIO in a given year on the premise that the 
richer the members, the greater the demand for international cooperation — and, corre-
spondingly, the degree of delegation to international organizations. (Summary statistics 
and bivariate correlations for all variables used in the analysis are contained in online 
Appendix D.)
Estimation and results
We now turn to the empirical testing of our claim that the EU systematically shapes pro-
cesses of institution building in other RIOs. We first discuss issues of model specifica-
tion, before then turning to the results and their robustness. A discussion of the control 
variables follows thereafter.
Model specification
The dependent variable is the level of delegation in an RIO, expressed as a continuous 
variable ranging from 0 to a theoretical maximum of 1, though the highest value in our 
data set is 0.452 (achieved by the Andean Community in 2006). As noted, our data set 
examines 34 RIOs between 1950 and 2010. Thus, our analysis is of panel data, meaning 
data that vary across time for a number of entities — that is, RIOs. Since we have only 
one dependent variable, we select linear least-squares regression as our technique. It 
must be noted that RIOs come into being at different times, meaning that our data are 
unbalanced; hence, we use fixed-effect models with robust standard errors (Greene, 
2008). Meanwhile, RIO delegation is lagged by one year in order to ensure that we 
mitigate any issues that may arise from endogeneity.
Furthermore, contractual open-endedness is a key variable, which takes two forms: 
analysed both on its own and as part of an interaction with active and passive EU influ-
ence. Contractual open-endedness takes values of 1 (fixed contract), 2 (intermediate con-
tract) and 3 (open-ended contract). As an interaction term, it serves to uncover whether 
active and passive EU influence vary across RIOs that differ as regards their contractual 
characteristics. The interaction takes the form:
Y c ax bx d x x SE        = + + + +( )1 2 1 2
where x1 is the continuous variable active EU influence/passive EU influence, x2 is 
the factor variable contractual open-endedness and d(x1x2) is the interaction term. 
In Models 3, 5 and 7, contractual incompleteness is used as a factor variable with a base 
of 1 (indicating, as noted, a fixed contract).
Lenz and Burilkov 671
Results
Results are presented in Table 2. The models are: (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) 
active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; 
(4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with contractual incom-
pleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; and (7) active and passive EU influence 
interacted with contractual incompleteness.
In line with Hypothesis 1, we find robust evidence that active EU influence — an 
aggregate index of funding, interregional agreements and institutionalized contacts — is 
associated with higher levels of delegation in other RIOs. This comes with positive and 
strongly statistically significant coefficients in Models 2 and 6. These results indicate 
that the EU’s efforts to boost regional institutionalization are successful, and do exert an 
independent effect on delegation. Disaggregating active EU influence into its three con-
stituent components and conducting the regression with each of the components inde-
pendently does not affect the results (for details, see online Appendix E.1).
Passive EU influence, on the other hand, is measured by the EU’s own delegation 
trajectory. Model 4 indicates that higher levels of delegation in other RIOs are associated 
with increases in the EU’s own delegated authority, and this result holds true when both 
active and passive EU influence are included (Model 6).
On its own, contractual incompleteness is significantly correlated with delegation — 
meaning that organizations based on more open-ended commitments are more likely to 
achieve high levels of delegation. This holds true for organizations with highly incom-
plete contracts when interacted with active and passive EU influence. These results are 
in line with our hypothesis that RIOs possessing an endogenous capacity for change are 
more likely to go through it.
The effect of active EU influence varies across different types of RIOs, as captured by 
contractual incompleteness. Specifically, active EU influence greatly increases in organ-
izations that have an open-ended founding contract — as demonstrated by the positive 
and significant interactions in Models 3 and 7. On organizations that restrict the actors of 
cooperation to governments (intermediate contract) — let alone on those with a fixed 
contract — the EU has very limited influence. These results bolster our conditional 
hypothesis that active EU influence is most effective in RIOs that are disposed of an 
endogenous capacity for institutional change because unspecified commitments provide 
space for the creation of new institutional mechanisms — as well as the strengthening 
and reforming of existing mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, most of the case-study evidence 
that has demonstrated EU influence on other RIOs concerns organizations with open-
ended founding contracts — including Mercosur, SADC and the CAN.
Just as for active EU influence, we find strong support for the idea that institutional 
evolution in the EU is associated with a change in delegation in specific types of organi-
zations, namely, those based on open-ended contracts. Models 5 and 7 consistently show 
a positive and statistically significant effect for the respective interaction term. These 
results thus lend strong support to the conditional hypothesis that only organizations with 
open-ended commitments are responsive to changes in the EU’s own delegated author-
ity. Where the ultimate purpose of cooperation is clearly defined from the outset, institu-
tional change in an important reference organization — in this case, the EU — does not 
affect an organization’s own level of delegation.
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How substantive is the effect of active engagement between the EU and other RIOs 
on delegation? Figure 2 plots the predicted values of RIO delegation for the different 
values (low, up to the 33rd percentile; medium, between the 33rd and 66th percentiles; 
high, between the 66th and 100th percentiles) of our active EU influence measure over 
time, with other variables being held at their mean. It shows that delegation grows faster 
Table 2. EU influence and delegation in RIOs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contractual 
incompleteness
1.3***
(0.266)
 
Active EU influence 0.848***
(0.285)
0.498***
(0.126)
0.67**
(0.299)
0.403**
(0.164)
* Intermediate contract −0.134
(1.088)
−0.037
(0.293)
* Open-ended contract 0.587*
(0.346)
1.463**
(0.693)
Passive EU influence 6.044***
(1.220)
3.96***
(1.287)
4.785***
(1.208)
3.185**
(1.366)
* Intermediate contract 0.934
(0.791)
0.174
(0.618)
* Open-ended contract 3.323***
(0.861)
3.752***
(0.974)
Regional delegation −0.308
(0.191)
−0.081
(0.211)
−0.117
(0.199)
−0.151
(0.245)
−0.172
(0.198)
−0.046
(0.221)
−0.158
(0.194)
Global delegation 4.881**
(2.297)
4.756*
(2.642)
1.319
(2.139)
0.463
(2.263)
−3.135
(2.094)
0.428
(2.226)
−3.106
(2.115)
RIO globalization −0.004
(0.013)
−0.003
(0.013)
−0.016
(0.01)
0.008
(0.011)
−0.01
(0.009)
0.009
(0.011)
−0.005
(0.007)
Cold War −0.103
(0.061)
−0.020
(0.080)
−0.086
(0.053)
−0.144*
(0.079)
−0.029
(0.046)
−0.146*
(0.082)
−0.034
(0.042)
Intra-RIO trade 0.010
(0.01)
0.011
(0.01)
0.013
(0.009)
0.009
(0.009)
0.01
(0.008)
0.009
(0.008)
0.008
(0.006)
Power asymmetry 0.001
(0.041)
0.03
(0.045)
0.016
(0.043)
0.003
(0.044)
−0.022
(0.038)
0.013
(0.042)
−0.011
(0.037)
Members 0.019*
(0.010)
0.015
(0.014)
0.013
(0.015)
0.016
(0.011)
0.012
(0.01)
0.013
(0.013)
0.008
(0.011)
Democracy 0.029
(0.023)
0.036
(0.034)
0.024
(0.024)
0.037
(0.031)
0.015
(0.017)
0.03
(0.033)
0.008
(0.016)
GDP 0.000**
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Constant −5.58***
(0.595)
−3.26***
(0.652)
−2.92***
(0.428)
−6.1***
(0.81)
−5.33***
(0.644)
−5.5***
(0.889)
−4.91***
(0.593)
R2 — within 0.381 0.324 0.380 0.325 0.489 0.363 0.561
R2 — between 0.248 0.008 0.019 0.003 0.249 0.003 0.236
R2 — overall 0.170 0.072 0.106 0.057 0.220 0.092 0.198
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses). * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 
0.01.
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the more closely the EU engages with other RIOs. The most pronounced effect is in RIOs 
deeply engaged with the EU; this is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Yet, even for 
RIOs that have medium-level engagement with the EU, the effect on delegation is notice-
able, being statistically distinguishable from low or no active engagement from around 
1980 onwards.
This is also the case for passive EU influence. Figure 3 plots the predicted effects of 
the interaction over time based on Model 5, with other variables being held at their 
mean. It illustrates that EU delegation exerts its strongest impact on RIOs with an open-
ended founding contract. We interpret this result as evidence that the EU serves as an 
important reference point for learning and emulation processes, primarily for those 
RIOs that are similar to the EU with regard to open-ended commitments. Overall, these 
results lend strong support to the idea that, at least for specific types of organization, 
decision-making is indeed interdependent across organizations — and even in the 
absence of active EU influence.
Finally, our results also indicate that passive EU influence exerts a larger overall sub-
stantive effect on RIO delegation than active EU influence does. In concrete terms, an 
increase of one standard deviation in active EU influence leads to a 0.08 increase in 
delegation in other RIOs. This is equivalent to the establishment of a third-party dispute 
settlement body consisting of ad hoc arbitrators that, under certain conditions, can man-
date retaliatory sanctions. A one standard deviation increase in passive EU influence, in 
contrast, is associated with an increase of 0.15 in delegation, almost twice as much, 
which translates into the establishment of a general secretariat with executive functions, 
budgetary competences and a non-exclusive right to set the agenda on policy — further 
to the creation of a parliamentary body with consultative functions. As expected, these 
effects are somewhat larger for RIOs with open-ended contracts. Here, a one standard 
deviation increase in active EU influence increases delegation by 0.1 — a value that 
Figure 2. Active EU influence and RIO delegation for different levels of contractual 
incompleteness, 1950–2010.
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grows to 0.18 for passive EU influence. However, one should keep in mind that the sub-
stantive effect of passive influence is spread over the entire lifetime of the EU and affects 
all organizations in our sample, whereas active influence targets individual organizations 
and varies in its intensity. As a result, sustained active EU influence can have effects 
comparable (and additional) to passive EU influence in specific organizations — such as 
in the case of ECOWAS, CAN or SADC.
Robustness checks
A counter-argument may posit that active EU influence is endogenous to delegation 
because the EU might be interested in dealing with more established and significant 
organizations. In other words, high levels of RIO delegation may attract more extensive 
institutionalized engagement with the EU — rather than active EU influence causing an 
increase in RIO delegation per se. We therefore test for reverse causality by running the 
models of active EU influence with delegation as the independent variable, and active 
EU influence as the dependent variable — also including the interaction with contractual 
incompleteness. The results show that delegation is not a significant factor in determin-
ing whether the EU actively engages with a specific RIO or not (for details both on this 
and on all subsequent robustness tests, see online Appendix E.2).
On the basis of the assumption that channels of EU influence might be more infor-
mal due to membership overlap, we conducted the analysis while excluding European 
RIOs. However, this does not change the results already presented in Table 2. We 
also conducted the analysis using an alternative measure of passive EU influence 
drawn from Börzel’s (2005) study of the level and scope of European integration, 
having been updated by Frank Schimmelfennig for the recent period. This measure 
is highly correlated to our measure of passive influence (0.88). The results hold 
Figure 3. Passive EU influence and RIO delegation for different levels of contractual 
incompleteness, 1950–2010.
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constant both for the alternative measure alone and in combination with active EU 
influence, but the interaction term loses statistical significance. Finally, there is no 
substantive change in results when we extend the lag on the EU influence variables 
to two or even four years.
Controls
Finally, we consider the effects of our control variables. We first turn to alternative 
external influences. Regional diffusion appears to have a dampening effect (even though 
insignificant) on levels of delegation among neighbouring organizations in five conti-
nental macro-regions (the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia), as indi-
cated by the consistently negative sign of the coefficient. This represents a stark contrast 
to our finding that the direct and indirect pressures that the EU exerts on RIOs help to 
create stronger regional institutions, as it means that EU influence works in a different 
direction than trends in neighboring RIOs. Global delegation is volatile in its sign and 
does not appear to exert any systematic impact on RIO delegation. An ‘acceptable’ level 
of delegation appears not to have emerged among RIOs.
An RIO’s connectedness with the rest of the world (RIO globalization), which 
increased rapidly in tandem with the end of the Cold War, also seems to matter little. The 
sign changes across models, and it is never statistically significant. This is not surprising 
insofar as some of the most globalized RIOs — such as APEC, the European Free Trade 
Association and NAFTA — have low levels of delegation. Finally, the end of the Cold 
War had a positive influence on delegation in RIOs.3 This might have been due to 
the end of general bipolar competition, creating space for more independent RIOs, or 
specifically to the stalemate of multilateral trade negotiations, which led states to pursue 
alternative routes to trade liberalization. The fact that the Cold War dummy seldom 
reaches conventional levels of statistical significance suggests that other variables do 
pick up the ‘end of the Cold War’ effect.
We also find very limited support for all of the intraregional variables. Power asym-
metry is not consistently signed, indicating that various configurations of power sym-
metry between members in terms of capabilities have no impact on delegation. This 
challenges the neorealist claim that powerful states are reluctant to cede sovereignty. We 
also find almost no support for the neoliberal-institutionalist claim that intraregional 
trade interdependence affects delegation, confirming a recent finding by Haftel (2013). 
Some of the strongest regional institutions can be found in regions where trade interde-
pendence is comparatively low, such as Africa and Latin America.
There is some support for the rational design claim that more members lead to more 
delegation, confirming a finding by Hooghe and Marks (2015). The coefficients are con-
sistently positive (but non-significant), suggesting that the functional pressures for del-
egation in large membership organizations often overcome the threat of decisional 
blockage that increases as the number of members goes up. Finally, there is some support 
for the influence of democracy. The coefficient is consistently positive, cautiously sup-
porting the idea that RIOs with more democratic member states tend to delegate more 
extensively; however, these results are driven mainly by European RIOs. Finally, per 
capita GDP is irrelevant as a predictor of RIO delegation.
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Conclusion
In this article, we demonstrate statistically the active and passive influence of the EU on 
the trajectory of institution building in other RIOs, doing so by drawing on a new and 
original data set that measures variation in the institutional design of 34 organizations in 
the period from 1950 to 2010.
The findings of our analysis imply that existing theories of regionalism are incom-
plete, specifically because they focus on causal factors internal to a particular RIO and 
thereby neglect the wider contexts in which these organizations emerge and evolve. Even 
though some scholars acknowledge that RIOs change in response to external pressures 
— new regionalism scholars emphasize globalization, realists emphasize outside secu-
rity threats — there is little recognition that institutional choices are regularly interde-
pendent between organizations. Further, institutional pioneers such as the EU have an 
incentive to actively shape other organizations in their field and, especially when suc-
cessful, they serve as reference points by providing institutional designs that others can 
learn from and emulate.
This might be one reason why integration theories developed in the European context 
do not travel well. In the 1970s, neofunctionalists abandoned their endeavours to develop 
a general theory of regional integration, while liberal intergovernmentalism has barely 
been applied outside of Europe. Explanations for institutional innovations differ funda-
mentally from those for subsequent institutional adoption in diffusion research. Whereas 
the former tend to reflect the structural conditions of an organization — in other words, 
functional explanations are often pertinent — subsequent adoptions are often the result 
of diffusion — with endogenous conditions being insufficient explanations for a given 
institutional design (Finnemore, 1993). Hence, the relative weight of internal and exter-
nal factors in the explanation of institutional evolution shifts over time towards the latter 
as institutional innovators become active proponents of their institutional design and an 
organizational field becomes structured. Existing theories of regionalism have largely 
neglected this insight.
Beyond theories of regionalism, our analysis also has implications for the quantitative 
literature on diffusion. The analysis shows that organizational pioneers, such as the EU, 
are important providers of institutional designs for other RIOs — thereby answering the 
seemingly simple question: where do the diffused institutional designs actually come 
from? Recent quantitative studies of policy and institutional diffusion have had a hard 
time answering this question because they generally conceptualize diffusion in terms of 
horizontal connections between units of analysis that are modelled through spatial lags, 
sometimes in a strictly dyadic set-up. The analytical concern therein is with identifying 
the relevant connections through which diffusion occurs (for an overview, see Gilardi, 
2012). This approach has been powerful in establishing that policymaking is regularly 
interdependent between organizations, and also in identifying the relevant ‘reference 
groups’ that facilitate this diffusion. The current analysis implies, however, that such 
studies tend to misconceive of international diffusion processes as overly decentralized 
and uncoordinated. This article suggests that institutional diffusion can, in fact, also be 
an asymmetrical process, even a hierarchical one, in which influence primarily flows 
outwards from important institutional pioneers.
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Beyond these broad theoretical implications, it is also worth asking whether the EU’s 
influence is likely to remain high for the foreseeable future — specifically in view of 
recent developments such as the Euro crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit. Scepticism 
is warranted as the EU’s credibility as the most successful RIO has suffered — thus also 
calling into question the attractiveness of the ‘EU model’. Consequently, EU policymak-
ers’ enthusiasm to export that model may have waned too. Nevertheless, as long as the 
EU continues to provide financial support to regional institutions elsewhere and as long 
as stronger regional institutions serve important purposes for regional cooperation — a 
lesson from the EU experience that remains valid — its loss of influence may ultimately 
only be transitory. The strongest effects on EU influence may thus concern not the 
strength of regional institutions, but instead other important issues of regional coopera-
tion that have been more directly affected by the various crises. Examples are the scope 
of membership or the ambition of integration objectives; for the foreseeable future, deci-
sive moves towards economic and monetary union elsewhere are perhaps less likely.
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Notes
1. The relationship between design and actual cooperation in RIOs is ambiguous, and requires 
more systematic study. For contending views, see Haftel (2013) and Gray (2014a), who 
emphasize implementation gaps, and Alter (2014), who shows that institutional design makes 
a difference to cooperative outcomes.
2. For the sake of brevity, we use the acronym ‘EU’ to refer to both today’s EU as well as its 
predecessors.
3. It is negatively signed because it assumes a value of 0 after 1990.
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